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TWENTY PAGES AND TWENTY MINUTESEFFECTIVE ADVOCACY ON APPEAL
by
John C. Godbold*

T

HIS Article is about effective appellate advocacy in the federal courts,
particularly the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. My comments are
from the side of the bench that reads what advocates write and listens to what
they say, so I include in my discussion of appellate advocacy both brief
writing and oral argument. The comments are solely mine. I cannot even say
that all my colleagues of the Fifth Circuit agree with them. I have not asked.
I have discussed this subject with the practicing bar in speeches and
seminars. An article reducing those informal dialogues to writing may appear
simplistic, but I prefer the risk of oversimplification rather than even a
whisper of unnecessary complexity. Communication in simple, understandable terms is a central theme for me.
The subject of effective appellate advocacy has been thoroughly worked
over' but it always deserves renewed discussion. New lawyers enter the
practice. Times change. Courts are continually re-examining their procedures
and habits with cold and critical eyes. Judges are less and less willing to accept
an answer that we do something, and do it in a particular way, because that is
what the institution has always done. Courts are more often asking themselves: "Why do we do this at all?" "Why do we do it in this way?" "Can we
do it better, and can we do it more easily?"
Appellate practice is also changing. Bench and bar are learning to get to the
bare bones of disputes with less concern for the fat. The discursive or
repetitious brief and the hyperbolic argument are no longer welcome. There is
an overall air of "no nonsense." At the same time, the conception of the
typical appellate advocate as a wily veteran of many cases and master of
rules, tactics, and wit, is changing. Our judicial system is becoming more
sophisticated. Appointment of counsel as a matter of right in indigent criminal
appeals is bringing to the appellate courtroom lawyers who otherwise might
not be there. 2 I do not imply that today's advocates are less effective than
their predecessors. Many are superb. But all need all the help they can get.
An even more immediate reason requires the written brief to have maximum effectiveness. A written brief may be the only shot that counsel gets at
the appellate court. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has moved reluctantly to
deciding without oral argument appeals which are frivolous or simple or in
which the court concludes oral argument will not be helpful. Approximately
half of the Fifth Circuit's cases are placed on the summary calendar and
* B.S., Auburn University; J.D., Harvard University. Circuit Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

I. Two texts which have been helpful to me are: E. RE,

ARGUMENT

(4th ed. 1974); F.

BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL

WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS

(1967).

2. More than half of the lawyers who enter appearances before the Fifth Circuit are
appearing for the first time.
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decided on the briefs and record.3 Other courts are moving in the same
direction with procedures such as affirmance by a simple order and without
argument. Consequently the advocate must use to his full potential the tools
4
available to him.
I.

THE APPEAL PROCESS

Presentation of an appellate case involves an assembly at a formal meeting
place 5 under the rules of a highly structured system. Gathered together are
- the lawyers (and the parties, if they want to come),
- the records and evidentiary materials of the case,
- advance written statements of the positions of the parties (the briefs),
and
- a body of official deciders (the judges),
for the purpose of having a short, reasoned discussion about the case.
Following the assembly, a decision is reached by the official deciders with
perhaps a written statement explaining how it was reached.
Counsel's role in this assembly is communication and persuasion, first by
the briefs and then by the oral argument. When the meeting occurs the judges
ordinarily will have done their homework ahead of time and will be sufficiently acquainted with the matters under discussion that they can understand
what is said and perhaps participate in the dialogue. Counsel's participation is
specifically defined and rigidly constricted. His skills of communication and
persuasion must be brought to bear in a few pages and a few minutes. After
this encounter, his role is at an end except for the remote possibilities of
rehearing and certiorari.
There are two steps in counsel's task. He hopes ultimately to convince the
court that what he advances is correct. To do this he must impress his will
upon the judges so that they will find acceptable what he urges. He cannot win
until he moves off dead center the deciders who read what he has written and
who listen to what he says. But there is a preliminary step. Before counsel can
convince he must inform. He must cause the court to understand him. The
process of linguistic communication has been described in this way:
3. According to the Fifth Circuit's statistical projections made in May 1976, if the court had
not set up the summary calendar it would have had on that date a backlog of approximately 4,770
cases, nearly all civil. Approximately 47% of our cases are designated "preference" cases by
statute or rule, so, even with the summary calendar, the court is falling behind with hearings of
"nonpreference" cases. In June 1976 the court had approximately 520 cases ready for oral
argument. Some will be displaced by preference cases. Of these cases then ready, some are not
expected to be heard until 1978, if then.
'he court projected that, even though it continues the summary calendar, the last of appeals

filed in 1977 will not be decided until 1981, and the last of those filed in 1978 will not be decided
until 1983. Chief Judge John R. Brown, The State of the Judiciary in the Fifth Circuit (May 24,
1976).

4. A portion of this Article goes beyond the strict confines of advocacy and touches, but
only touches, on mechanics of the appeal. The definitive guide on this subject is the Fifth
Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures Manual published in June 1976 [hereinafter referred to as
Manual]. This highly useful handbook describes the structure of the court and admission to
practice. It outlines the filing of an appeal and the mechanics of perfecting and filing the record.
For the period after the appeal is docketed by the court, it deals with motion practice, briefs,
records and appendices, and operation of the summary calendar. It describes the calendaring of
cases for oral argument and the conduct of arguments. For the post-argument period, it covers
issuance of opinions and petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc. Lawyers admitted to
practice in the Fifth Circuit can secure copies of the Manual from the clerk free of charge.
5.

For discussion purposes I assume there will be oral argument.
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[T]he gulf that often separates sender and receiver [of communications],
spanned at best by a bridge of signs and symbols, is sought to be
narrowed yet further so that ultimately the intended communication may
have the same meaning, or approximately the same meaning, for those on
the left bank as those on the right.6
It is not enough that counsel understands perfectly what he is saying in his
written and spoken words. All is in vain unless the court understands. In his
heart, if not in his consciousness, counsel knows this. But in a significant
percentage of cases the advocate is so intent upon the ultimate aim of
persuasion that he overleaps the threshold step of making clear to the court
what he complains of, how it came about, what he wants the court to do about
it, and why.
A.

The Decision To Appeal

Whether an appeal should be taken is an unexplored frontier of litigation.
Texts abound on how to prepare and try a case and how to handle an appeal.
No text that I have seen devotes more than passing interest to whether a party
dissatisfied with the result of trial should appeal. There is similarly a stark
contrast between counsel's approach to the question of whether to go to trial
and his approach to whether to appeal. The able lawyer will appraise with
microscopic care his chances of winning at trial. He will exhaust the full
spectrum of available options to avoid a trial which in his judgment he cannot
win. But having been through trial of a case-good or bad-and having lost,
the same able counsel will appeal without a precise appraisal of his case.
Rather than employ the kind of professional scrutiny that he would put into a
decision on whether to go to trial, he will react to the nerve-ends of disappointment and defiance. Ironically, trial losses are seldom recorded in the
reporter systems, but the annals do report lost appeals, and the losing
lawyer's name is forever inscribed in the annals for all to see.
Considered purely on a statistical basis, the chances of success on appeal
are not good. In the 1975-76 court year of the Fifth Circuit the rates of reversal
for various types of cases ran as follows:
Criminal
U.S. civil
Private civil
Administrative appeals
All cases

10.8%
18.6%
22.5%
9.1%
16.8% 7

I make an educated guess that of the more than 3,000 appeals per year in the
Fifth Circuit, less than ten cases per year are reversed on insufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury verdict. Yet in many appeals this point is the only
significant issue raised. When the court refuses to give a requested jury
instruction and has given an instruction to the same effect but in different
language, the chances of reversal are virtually nil. Similarly, reversals are rare
in the federal system for erroneous rulings on admissibility of evidence.
6. M. MEHLER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL COMMUNICATION 3 (1975).
7.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

DIRECTOR, table B-I.
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Petitions for rehearings en banc are even less successful. In the 1975-76
court year 309 petitions for rehearing en banc were filed in the Fifth Circuit.

Many, if not most, of these were wastes of time, money, and the effort of
lawyers and judges. Each petition had to be considered by all active judges on
the court. Only sixteen petitions were granted, five percent of those
requested and one-half of one percent of the appeals. The standards for
granting en banc rehearings are:

[A hearing or rehearing en banc] is not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered except (I) when consideration by the full court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance. 8
Thus, en banc consideration is not justified merely because a judge, a number
of judges, or even a majority of the judges, simply disagree with the decision.
The judge must conclude that the case either presents questions of "exceptional importance" or requires the full court to consider the case in the
interest of uniformity of its decisions. Conflict with another circuit is not a
sufficient ground if the case is not of "exceptional importance." Moreover,
judges are experienced at recognizing efforts to inflate pedestrian cases to a
larger status deserving of en banc consideration. 9
The question of how long an appeal will take is another factor in the

decision whether to appeal. Median time for decision of either criminal cases
or civil cases on the summary calendar is sixty-two days from the filing of the

reply brief. Counsel can request summary calendar disposition, but judges
decide ultimately whether the case is disposed of in that manner or set for
argument. Each case not decided on the summary calendar is calendared for
oral argument. The median time for calendaring criminal cases is approxi8. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
9. In 1976 the Fifth Circuit amended its local rules by adding the following provision to its
local rule 12:
Where the petitioner for rehearing en banc is represented by counsel, the
petition shall contain on the first page of the petition one or both of the following
statements of counsel as applicable:
REQUIRED STATEMENT FOR REHEARING EN BANC
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment,
that the panel decision is contrary to the following decision(s) of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit [or the Supreme Court of the
United States], and that consideration by the full court is necessary to secure
and maintain uniformity of decisions in this court: [citing specifically the case
or cases].
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment,
that this appeal involves one or more questions of exceptional importance: [set
forth each question in one sentence].
Attorney of record for
Counsel are reminded that en banc consideration of a case is an extraordinary
measure, and that in every case the duty of counsel is fully discharged without
filing a suggestion for rehearing en banc unless the case meets the rigid standards
of Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
5TH CIR. R. 12.
This rule serves several purposes. It acquaints counsel with the standards for granting en banc
rehearing. It brings counsel nose-to-nose with an appraisal of his chances and with awareness of
his professional responsibility. It ameliorates to a degree the fear of the attorney in a criminal case
that he will be charged with ineffective assistance of counsel if he does not seek rehearing en banc
even though the case does not possibly qualify for it.
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mately four months after the last brief is filed, and for non-preference civil
cases approximately fourteen months after the last brief.
Once a case has been argued and submitted, the median decision time for
crimlinal cases is fifty-two days. Civil cases will usually take a little longer.
Decision time in any case, civil or criminal, is almost never more than a year.
In fact, less than one-half of one percent of the cases remain undecided for as
much as a year after submission, excluding cases that go en banc and cases in
which decision is withheld pending action by the Supreme Court or the court
en banc in another case.
Some appeals are clearly delay devices intended to keep the civil judgment
debtor in possession of his money or to keep the criminal defendant out of jail
a little longer. Whether the criminal appellant is permitted to stay out on bail
pending appeal depends primarily upon the district court's application of the
Bail Reform Act.' 0 If the district court denies bail pending appeal, the
defendant can seek review of the denial in the court of appeals, but the battle
will be uphill. Once a conviction is affirmed the court of appeals does not stay
its mandate pending petition for certiorari except in extraordinary cases. For
the civil appellant with a money judgment against him, however, a meritless
appeal can be a boondoggle. He is exposed to no loss other than interest and
his expenses on appeal, and, if market conditions are right, he may earn as
much on his money as the loss to which he is exposed."
B.

The Appealable Order

Counsel cannot start on the appellate route until he has two tickets, a notice
of appeal and a final judgment or "appealable order" from which the appeal is
taken. The substantive law of appealability is beyond the scope of this
Article, but generally one can only appeal (1) from a final judgment in the
case, (2) from a judgment entered under rule 54(b) that is final as to less than
all issues or less than all parties (which requires an express determination by
the district court), or (3) under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which requires both
express findings by the district court and leave of the court of appeals.
Dismissal for want of an appealable order occurs more frequently than one
would expect. One of the parties may raise the point, but, if not, the court of
appeals is compelled to take notice of its lack of jurisdiction. In the last ten
days I have had before me three cases, one set for oral argument and two
potential summary calendar cases, in which appeals were improvidently
taken. One of them contains an interesting dialogue between counsel discussing the fact that they desire a trial court ruling on point A from which the loser
can appeal, while reserving all rights to later litigate point B after the appeal is
decided. Even though the judge reminded them of the final judgment rule, the
judgment later prepared by counsel and signed by the judge was not final as to
all issues, no 54(b) determination was made, nor was § 1292(b) complied with.
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
I1. Possibly the federal system should consider whether it would benefit from statutory
provisions like those in some states, giving the appellate court power to add a monetary penalty
where a money judgment is appealed from, superseded and affirmed. SeeALA. CODE tit. 7, § 814
(1958) (mandatory 10% penalty).
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The Record on Appeal

Most counsel routinely, and frequently without thought, designate in
advance under Fed. R. App. P. 30(a) the portions of the record to be
reproduced as an appendix. This decision is often a convenient nondecision to
reproduce the entire record. A splendid appellate tool, the deferred appendix
as provided by Fed. R. App. P. 30(c), was long ignored by practitioners, but it
is coming into more use as its potentialities are appreciated. On request the
clerk's office of the court of appeals will provide counsel with a procedural
manual describing the use of the deferred appendix.
It is only after writing his brief that the appellate lawyer knows the precise
contours of what he needs to include in the appendix. Under the deferred
appendix system he uses the original record in writing his brief, then he
designates the appendix. This permits him to designate at a time when he can,
with confidence, specify what is really needed and omit everything else. 12 The
advocate's communication with the court is consequently less cluttered, less
expensive, and performed with less effort. Moreover, counsel is more likely
to concentrate on selecting the critical issues. If he has designated the
appendix in advance under rule 30(a) and has reproduced more material than
he needs, he tends to labor under the self-induced pressure to address every
point that the appendix reveals regardless of its importance to the real issues
in the case.
The bar has scarcely scratched the surface of the usefulness of another
procedure, the appeal on an agreed statement, which is authorized by Fed. R.
App. P. 10(d):
Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in subdivision (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare
and sign a statement of the case showing how the issues presented by the
appeal arose and were decided in the district court and setting forth only
so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are
essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms
to the truth, it, together with such additions as the court may consider
necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be
approved by the district court and shall then be certified to the court of
appeals as the record on appeal and transmitted thereto by the clerk of
the district court within the time provided by Rule 11. Copies of the
agreed statement may be filed as the appendix required by Rule 30.11
This procedure is most effective where the relevant facts are simple and the
issue precise. For example, I recall an appeal in which the sole issue was
admissibility of a document under a business records statute. Everything that
the appellate court needed to know could have been stated in a one-page
agreed statement and in five-page briefs. But the case was freighted with the
full panoply of an appeal, printed appendix (including a full trial transcript),
and briefs stating all the facts. Counsel did not attempt to misdirect the court.
They just wheeled up the heavy artillery, needlessly, simply because that was
the familiar way to do it.
12.
13.

References in briefs to the record and appendix are a little trouble, but worth it.
FED. R. APP. P. 10(d). Unfortunately, the Manual does not refer to this procedure.
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Counsel need not avoid the appeal on an agreed statement for fear of
omitting some fact the court considers vital for decision. The court has the
power to refer to the original record.

II.

TRIPS DOWN A SIDE TRACK

At this point I detour from the main route to talk about some preliminary
matters.
The manner and necessity of preparing for an appeal while in the trial court
can be stated succinctly: get in your objection to the admission of evidence,14
make your objections to jury instructions, and do it before the jury retires. 15
Where there is prejudicial argument, make your objection, ask for a corrective instruction, and move for a mistrial.
When an objection is not made, the appellate standard of review shifts from
"error" to "plain error," a more stringent standard. Also, the appellant who
does not object must overcome the added reluctance of appellate judges to
hold that a trial ruling or incident is reversible error where the trial judge was
given no opportunity to correct it when it occurred. Finally, with the increasing demands on judicial resources, trial and appellate, the objection is
becoming more important than ever, not merely because it serves as the
formal recording of a predicate for a later appeal, which is the way most
attorneys tend to view it, but because it is the trigger device for the immediate
correction of trial error at the time it occurs.
The pressure for trial of criminal cases is intensive, especially since the
adoption of the Speedy Trial Act. 6 At the same time access to the district
courts for civil trials is increasingly difficult. (In early 1976 one young,
vigorous and energetic district judge in this circuit had not heard a civil case
for a year and a half.) At the appellate level, the Fifth Circuit operates under a
self-imposed system for expediting criminal appeals.17 The percentage of
criminal cases has continued to increase until today almost half of the court's
docket consists of criminal and other "preference" cases. 18 Consequently, as
the waiting lines for access to federal trial and appellate courts grow longer,
judges will inevitably increase their insistence that trial counsel who gets his
turn at bat carry his share of responsibility for an error-free trial. Other
litigants are entitled to their turns, too. Burying a land mine at trial and
exploding it on appeal will get less and less sympathy.
III.

PRESENTATION OF A CASE IN AN APPELLATE COURT

A.

The Court's Interest in Effective Advocacy

The appellate judge shares with counsel a common interest in the advocate's effective performance of his double-barrelled task of informing and
persuading. The judge wants counsel to get the maximum mileage from the
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 46.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. V, 1975).
17. Fifth Circuit Plan for Expediting Criminal Appeals, app. to local rules; Manual 5.
18. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. Some of the court's oral argument calendars
(i.e., 20 cases set for hearing in one week before one panel) during 1976 will be composed entirely
of criminal cases.
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few pages and few minutes allotted to him. True, cases are won on the facts
and the law, not on the eminence, polished writing, oratory, or personality of
counsel. Counsel can, and often does, lose with a good performance and win
with a poor one. The court gives no medals for good briefs and arguments, and
it seldom exacts a penalty for a poor performance. But identifying and
treating the facts and the appropriate law are often matters of reasonable
differences of opinion, particularly at the appellate level. Also, the court's
interest is not limited to identified facts but extends to inferences drawn from
those facts.
Judges need all the help they can get in identifying and understanding the
issues, legal and factual, and reaching the right answer. They are neither
all-wise nor all-seeing. Whether in his library or on the bench, the judge is
trying with every ounce of his capacity to traverse the path from issue to
answer. Every intellectual pore is open to receive help and guidance from
what the lawyers say and write. That guidance is most telling when there is a
minimum of artificial obstacles and irrelevant diversions that impede communication. 19 Unfortunately, lawyers erect in their own paths obstacles that
impede the processes of informing and persuading the court and obstruct the
judge's progress from issue to answer.
Courtroom lawyers as a breed are endowed with at least a bit more ego than
the average person. Few are shrinking violets. Under an adversary system in
which someone must win and someone lose the loser is tempted to use the
appellate court as a forum to soothe his bruised self-esteem, and the winner is
equally tempted to seek additional elevation of his already triumphant ego.
Each attorney wants the approval of the appellate body for his position. The
loser at trial hopes for the additional balm of being told that the trial court was
wrong, wrong, wrong, and the winner wishes for confirmation of a "just"
decision. Ego building and esteem-repairing are unobjectionable unless they
interfere with the essential functions of communication and persuasion.
Sometimes they do interfere. Issues are advanced and statements made that
predictably will not affect the disposition of the case.
The lawyer is filled with his case, proud if he won, unhappy if he lost. It
makes him feel better to share his experiences with the court. Like a
participant in a divorce case, he wants to tell everything that has ever
happened to him, particularly if it is unpleasant. I have a file of examples of
poor appellate advocacy to which I will refer throughout this Article. One of
the exhibits in it is a fifty-eight-page brief, of which nineteen pages, one-third
of the brief, are devoted to complaints about rulings and events before trial
and at trial, followed by a statement that none of these matters is claimed to be
reversible error. The crucial question in the case, the clearly predictable basis
for appellate decision, is given three pages of superficial and incomplete
discussion. Counsel squandered his time and his client's money to compose
and print a litany of bruises to his emotions. The court lost the benefit of the
guidance and assistance it wanted, needed, and should have been given on
those wasted pages.
19. Additionally, of course, every judge has a collateral intere3t, a sense of pleasure and
pride, in seeing the advocate's job well done.
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B.

Selecting and Stating the Issues

Each year I tell my law clerks that the most valuable by-product of clerking
is grasping the fact that the dispositive issues in appeals are highly predictable. As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote:
One of the first tests of a discriminating advocate is to select the
question, or questions, that he will present orally. Legal contentions, like
the currency, depreciate through over-issue. The mind of an appellate
judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors
increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. Of course, I
have not forgotten the reluctance with which a lawyer abandons even the
weakest point lest it prove alluring to the same kind of judge. But
experience on the bench convinces me that multiplying assignments of
20
error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one.
Thus, counsel must select with dispassionate and detached mind the issues
that common sense and experience tell him are likely to be dispositive. He
must reject other issues or give them short treatment. For oral argument
counsel may have to be even more selective than in writing his brief. There is
simply no way to present eight or ten issues in twenty or thirty minutes.
The great advocate John W. Davis made this same point although in
different terms. He spoke of the "cardinal rule" that one must, in imagination, change places with the court.
Yet those judges who sit in solemn array before you, whatever their
merit, know nothing whatever of the controversy that brings you to
them, and are not stimulated to interest in it by any feeling of friendship
or dislike to anyone concerned. They are not moved as perhaps an
advocate may be by any hope of reward or fear of punishment. They are
simply being called upon for action in this appointed sphere. They are
anxiously waiting to be supplied with what Mr. Justice Holmes called the
'implements of decision.' These by your presence you profess yourself
ready to furnish. If the places were reversed and you sat where they do,
think what it is you would want first to know about the case. How and in
what order would you want the story told? How would you want the
skein unraveled? What would make easier your approach to the true
solution? These are questions the advocate must unsparingly put to
himself. This is what I mean by changing places with the court. I
I recall an especially effective presentation by a young lawyer, formerly a
law clerk for another circuit judge, who walked to the podium of our court and
said: "My name is So & So, from Houston, Texas. The issue in this case is
whether Chambers v. Maroney is retroactive." He had laid all else aside and
gone for the jugular. In two sentences he had identified himself, precisely
targeted the dispositive issue on which discussion would be centered and the
case decided, and had attracted the interest and attention of the court. The
room came alive. Everyone was mentally on the edge of his chair. In seconds
counsel had riveted the attention of all participants onto the question that all
concerned knew was critical.
. 20. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presenta-

tions, in ADVOCACY AND THE KING'S ENGLISH 193 (G. Rossman ed. 1960).
21. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, in ADVOCACY AND THE KING'S
Rossman ed. 1960).

ENGLISH 216

(G.
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In contrast, I have in my files the briefs in a civil case in which there are
either five or six issues depending upon how one wishes to slice them. The
appellant's brief states them as twenty-two issues. 22 The appellee restates and
regroups them into sixteen issues. The reply brief disagrees with appellee's
restatement and contains a partial third regrouping. In appellee's brief each
restated point begins with a statement about like this: "This point covers
appellant's points 2, 5, and first half of 7, and the second half of 14." To make
our way through this maze my clerk and I prepared a mammoth chart with
lines, arrows, and boxes, making the necessary consolidations and separations and rationally redefining the issues. It looks like the organizational chart
for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In the box where each
issue is described is a notation like this: "Read pp. 4-6, 14-17 and 42-44, Brief
I; pp. 19-22 and 31-35 of Brief II; pp. 2-3 and 10 of Brief III." Counsel in this
case were not engaged in communication but in saying things that were not
communicated. The communicatee had to devise his own communications
system in order to understand what the two communicators were trying to tell
him.
Argumentative statement, and restatement, of issues is a specialty of
attorneys from one state (which will remain not nameless but unnamed). In a
case, where the issue could be described as "contributory negligence" or
"was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence?," the statement and
restatement may come out as follows. Defendant: "The plaintiff was guilty of
the grossest kind of contributory negligence in veering over the center line of
Highway 82 and into the path of defendant's truck." Plaintiff: "The plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence and did not drive over the center line
of Highway 82 but in fact drove his car with the utmost due care." Or, the
statement-restatement could run this way. Defendant: "The plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence." Plaintiff: "The plaintiff was not guilty of
contributory negligence." No one gains any advantage, tactical, persuasive,
or otherwise, from these semantical ploys.23 I assume that the statementrestatement procedure, properly utilized, affords counsel the opportunity to
correct incorrectly stated issues. But, at least as applied in the federal system
(where the rules do not even provide for it), it is a compulsive play upon
words, a charade without utility.
C. The Standard of Review
The standard of review is the appellate judge's "measuring stick." Early in
the appeal counsel must familiarize himself with the appropriate standard of
appellate review for each issue. He cannot adequately prepare his case
without that knowledge. For example, for a ruling of law he must inquire:
"Was the court wrong or right?" For a finding of fact: "Was the court plainly
erroneous under rule 52(a)?" For review of an order denying a motion for a
new trial: "Did the court exceed its broad range of discretion?" For review of
22. There is no case in which 22 issues should be raised on appeal.
23. F. WIENER, supra note 1, at 67, recommends argumentative headings in briefs. They do

nothing for me. Rather I resist the notion that I can be affected to any meaningful degree by the

semantics of a heading. Argumentative headings generate counter-arguments, and then the judge
must settle this side controversy in his own mind in order to identify the real controversy.
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an administrative order: "Is there substantial evidence on the record as a
whole?" Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury:
"Boeing v. Shipman." 24 Unless counsel is familiar with the standard of
review for each issue, he may find himself trying to run for a touchdown when
basketball rules are in effect.
Early in his presentation counsel should state to the court the standard of
review which he considers applicable. It is seldom necessary to do any more
than identify the standard without further quotation or argument. The court is
familiar with rule 52(a), plain error, abuse of discretion, Boeing v. Shipman,
25
and Universal Camera.
D.

Tell It Short and Plain

Communicate with the court, by pen and by voice, in terms as simple and as
easily understood as the subject matter permits. Each year I tell my clerks a
story told of General Stonewall Jackson. Pressed for an explanation why he
kept on his staff a not too bright officer, he replied: "When I have written a
field order, I have him read it. If he can understand it, anybody can
understand it." Write and talk that way to judges. Some are brilliant, some are
bright, some pedestrian. All want to understand, and understanding is the
condition precedent to persuasion.
Every lawyer can profit from Professor William Strunk, Jr.'s timeless little
book The Elements of Style.2 6 Priceless fundamentals of writing are crammed
into its few pages. If I were still in the practice I would get a copy for the desk
of each lawyer in the firm. E.B. White, himself a craftsman with words,
studied college English under Professor Strunk. In the introduction to the
1972 edition White referred to Strunk's "attempt to cut the vast tangle of
English rhetoric down to size." Then he said:
In its original form, it [the book] was a forty-three page summation of the
case for cleanliness, accuracy, and brevity in the use of English. Today,
fifty-two years later, its vigor is unimpaired, and for sheer pith I think it
probably sets a record that is not likely to be broken. 27
Several of Strunk's principles of composition are especially pertinent to
brief writing:
II. Put statements in positive form.
Make definite assertions. Avoid tame, colorless, hesitating, noncommittal language ...
12.

Use definite, specific, concrete language.

If those who have studied the art of writing are in accord on any one
point, it is on this: the surest way to arouse and hold the attention of the
reader is by being specific, definite, and concrete. The greatest writersHomer, Dante, Shakespeare-are effective largely because they deal in
24.
25.

Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

26. W. STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (2d ed. 1972). Inevitably someone will
test what I say by Professor Strunk's principles and find examples in which I am wanting. The
best I hope for is an acceptable batting average.
27. Id. at vii.
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particulars and report the details that matter. Their words call up
pictures.
13. Omit needless words.
Vigorous writing is concise. A sentence should contain no unnecessary
words, a paragraph no unnecessary sentences, for the same reason that a
drawing should have no unnecessary lines and a machine no unnecessary
parts. This requires not that the writer make all his sentences short, or
that he avoid
all detail and treat his subjects only in outline, but that every
28
word tell.
E.B. White comments on Professor Strunk's paragraph 13 about omitting
needless words:
There you have a short, valuable essay on the nature and beauty of
brevity-sixty-three words that could change the world. Having recovered from his adventure in prolixity (sixty-three words were a lot of
words in the tight world of William Strunk, Jr.), the professor proceeds to
give a few quick lessons in pruning. The student learns to cut the
deadwood from 'this is a subject that,' reducing it to 'this subject,' a
saving of three words. He learns to trim 'used for fuel purposes' down to
'used for fuel.' He learns that he is being a chatterbox when he says 'the
question as to whether' and that he should just say 'whether'-a saving
of four words out of a possible five. 29
White's own chapter, added to Professor Strunk's little book, contains other
gems of its own:
6. Do not overwrite.
Rich, ornate prose is hard to digest, generally unwholesome, and
sometimes nauseating. If the sickly-sweet word, the overblown phrase
are a writer's natural form of expression, as is sometimes the case, he will
have to compensate for it by a show of vigor, and by writing something as
meritorious as the Song of Songs, which is Solomon's.
7. Do not overstate.
When you overstate, the reader will be instantly on guard, and everything that has preceded your overstatement as well as everything that
follows it will be suspect in his mind, because he has lost confidence in
your judgment or your poise. Overstatement is one of the common
faults. A single overstatement, wherever or however it occurs,
diminishes the whole, and a single carefree superlative has the power to
destroy, for the reader, the object of the writer's enthusiasm.
14. Avoid fancy words.
Avoid the elaborate, the pretentious, the coy, and the cute. Do not be
tempted by a twenty-dollar word when there is a ten-center handy, ready
and able. Anglo-Saxon is a livelier tongue than Latin, so use AngloSaxon words.3 °
To the suggestions of Strunk and White, I add my own:
(a)
(b)

A simple declarative sentence can't be beat.
The active voice is more forcible, direct, and vigorous than the
passive.

28. Id. at 14, 15, 17.
29. Id. at x.
30. Id.at 65, 69.
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And, for terse clarity, who could improve on the schoolboy's essay on
Elijah?
There was a man named Elijah. He had some bears and lived in a cave.
Some boys tormented him. He said, 'If you keep on throwing stones at
me, I'll turn the bears on you,
31 and they will eat you up.' And they did, and
he did, and the bears did.
Rudolf Flesch's book The Art of Plain Talk32 is also a strong plea for
understandable writing and word usage. Flesch points out the following
language that "is hard even on lawyers":
Sick leave shall be granted to employees when they are incapacitated
for the performance of their duties by sickness, injury, or pregnancy and
confinement, or for medical, dental, or optical examination or treatment,
or when a member of the immediate family of the employee is affected
with a contagious disease and requires the care and attendance of the
employee, or when, through exposure to contagious disease, the presence of the employee at his post of duty would jeopardize the health of
others.3"
He suggests this formulation instead:
Employees shall be granted sick leave for these four reasons:
(1) They cannot work because of sickness, injury, or pregnancy and
confinement;
(2) They need medical, dental or optical treatment;
(3) A member of their immediate family is affected with a contagious
disease and needs their care and attendance;
(4) Their presence at their post of duty would jeopardize
the health of
34
others through exposure to contagious disease.
His restatement is not substantively perfect, but unquestionably it is more
quickly and more easily understood.
Compare these two statements of an issue:
(1) The plaintiff was not contributorily negligent when, as plaintiff was
on his way to church, defendant's 6-ton Mack truck thundered
through the red light and upon plaintiff's Pinto automobile at the
intersection of 8th and North streets in Savannah, Georgia, on
February 2, 1974.
(2) The trial judge was plainly erroneous in entering a finding of fact
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
There is everything wrong with (1). Whether the truck ran the light and struck
plaintiff's automobile, or plaintiff ran the light and drove in front of the truck,
was a disputed question of fact on which the entire contributory negligence
question turned. The references to defendant's six-ton truck, to plaintiff's
Pinto automobile, and to plaintiff's being on the way to church, were
sophomoric appeals to prejudice and sympathy. These matters had already
been set out in the statement of the facts and none had any relevance to the
contributory negligence issue. There was only one accident, so the names of
31.

32.
33.
34.

F. COOPER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 18 (1953).
R. FLESCH, THE ART OF PLAIN TALK (1946).

Id. at 36.
Id. at 36-37.
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the city and of the streets and the date were of no significance except to
designate the state in a diversity case.
The greatest fault, however, in the first statement is that the reader cannot
discern the message that the writer is attempting to communicate. Does he
mean that the trial judge found contributory negligence and that this finding
was plainly erroneous? Or, does he mean that there was a jury finding of
contributory negligence not supported by sufficient evidence? Or, does he
mean that there was no evidence of contributory negligence, so that as a
matter of law plaintiff was not guilty of it? Or, is he attempting to say that
there was some evidence of contributory negligence but not enough to submit
to a jury? Compare example (2) where in a short and simple statement the
court is told everything it needs to know without more.
Like other professionals, lawyers either love, or fall into, professional
jargon. Some words of the profession carry their own credentials and are
invaluable: "proximate cause," "self-incrimination," and "impeachment."
Other jargon adds nothing, and at times even obscures meaning. In the "no
value" category is the following example from my file:
Without waiving any point heretofore made but expressly relying upon
each and all of them, separately, severally and collectively, and without
reflecting
upon the able judge below, The Honorable
, United States District Judge for the
District of

, who ordinarily is fair, able

and well informed but nevertheless is subject to normal human error, I
am constrained to say, respectfully but firmly, that the District Judge
committed error to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff when he
declined to accept the argument made in Part IV of plaintiff's trial brief
relating to par. 7 of the complaint and instead accepted the contrary
argument of the defendant and ruled accordingly.
This is irrelevant nonsense, except for the concluding effort to describe the
error, and that effort conceals rather than describes the point. Only when the
reader reaches into the body of the succeeding argument is he able to piece
together the writer's contention. The author of this fog of words is an
intelligent man. If asked on the street how to get to the nearest gasoline station
he would say: "Turn right at the second stop light, go four blocks and you'll
see it on your left." But put a pencil in his hand and place him in his law
35
library, and he lapses into the noncommunicative patois of his profession.
Some writers describe issues in a form similar to the jurisdictional statement required by the Supreme Court. The jurisdictional statement serves an
important function, but it is a poor device for transferring information from
writer to reader. The writer who uses this format tries to crowd everything
into one sentence. He strings out clauses independent and dependent, modifiers, qualifications, parenthetical phrases, and exceptions to the exception,
all punctuated with citations. Here is a result:
35. In Strictly Speaking Edwin Newman describes a statement by White House press
secretary Ron Zeigler explaining a request for a four-day extension to produce records that had
been subpoenaed. The extension was needed, the press secretary said, so that attorney James St.
Clair could "evaluate and make a judgment in terms of a response." Newman comments: "We
are all of us ready to man the barricades for the right to evaluate and make a judgment in terms of a
response, but Ziegler could have said that St. Clair wanted more time to think about it." E.
NEWMAN, STRICTLY SPEAKING 13 (1975).
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In an action brought by the last assignee and holder of a negotiable
promissory note transferred to him by an assignor in good faith and upon
valuable consideration but after maturity, can the maker of the note who
is sued establish a setoff or counterclaim, whether matured or not, if
mature when pleaded, which setoff or counterclaim existed in favor of
the maker against the assignor
of the party suing, before notice to the
36
maker of the assignment?
This is a fit example for The New Yorker's "The Legal Mind at Work."
My file contains another striking example of how not to say it short and
plain. In a complex case the writer used the maximum allowable number of
pages in his brief after being denied permission to file an over-length brief.37
One of the major parties was United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,
known to everyone who has done much trial practice, and surely to the
briefwriter, as "USF&G." In every instance from the beginning of the brief
to the end, more than 200 times, USF&G is referred to as "defendantappellant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, a Maryland Corporation. " Similarly, in every instance the trial judge who conducted the bench
trial is described not as "the judge," "the court," "the trial judge," "Judge
Roe," or even "he," but as "Honorable Richard R. Roe, United States
District Judge for the __
District of __
." This is an example:
The Honorable Richard R. Roe, United States District Judge for the
__
District of
-,
erred when he overruled, denied and failed to
grant the objection of defendant-appellant United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company, a Maryland Corporation, to the admission into
evidence of this exhibit, which exhibit was irrelevant, incompetent,
immaterial, prejudicial and shed no light on any of the issues in the case.
Motivated by frustration and curiosity, I made a word count on the excess
baggage consisting of only the descriptions of USF&G and of the trial judge.
This verbiage used up sixteen pages of the brief, pages precious to both the
38
writer and to the court.
The indiscriminate use of dates is a Linus blanket for the writer, but cruel
and unusual punishment for the reader. I quote from a brief:
The grand jury returned the indictment March 2, 1974. Defendant was
arraigned March 17, 1974. He was tried beginning August 7, 1974. The
jurors began deliberating August 9, 1974, in the late afternoon, and
returned a verdict at midday August 10, 1974, after deliberating for six
hours. The motion for new trial was filed August 18, 1974, argued
September 10, 1974, after one continuance and denied by an order
entered September 15, 1974. Defendant timely appealed September 20,
1974.
36. Quoted in F. COOPER, supra note 31, at 23.
37. The Fifth Circuit rarely grants leave to file an over-length brief. Numerous requests for
leave are made because the writer has erred in his estimate, and when his brief has been printed he
first discovers that it is over-long. The court may give him relief for a mistake of a page or two. If
the excess is more than minimal, it is likely that the brief will have to be pruned down and
reprinted.
38. Following is the work of another writer who was, I assume, trained in the same school of
composition. "Defendant-appellant William R. Smith, Jr., says in his brief that as the officers
approached the car defendant-appellant William R. Smith, Jr., was not under the wheel, but
defendant-appellant William R. Smith, Jr., overlooks the testimony of the officers that defendant-appellant William R. Smith, Jr., was under the wheel."
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I read those dates and events assuming that the information was given for
some purpose, and attempted to file in my mind each date and event for future
recall. Like a person watching a striptease, I assumed that when all the layers
had been successively removed I would see something, but there was nothing
to see. There was no issue of timeliness or delay in the case. No date, in fact
no word or figure of this entire recital, served any useful function. It filled
priceless space and it diverted the reader from genuine objectives.
There is a corollary to the principle of "tell it short and plain." It is "tell it
once--or twice at most." Erosion by repetition is a poor way to convince.
Most judges will catch the point the first time it is developed. Almost all will
understand when it is run by the second time. Also, please, "tell it early." The
court blesses the lawyer who steps to the podium and, ZAP, like an arrow to
the center.of the target, strikes to the heart of the controversy.
The Fifth Circuit, of necessity, now schedules the majority of its oral
argument cases for twenty minutes to the side. I have a word of encouragement to the lawyers who think twenty minutes is too short. The advocate with
the maximum time of thirty minutes tends to use it uneconomically. He is
likely to be less direct in getting to the point and to dwell too long on
nonessentials. Counsel with twenty minutes knows that he is stripped to the
bare bones and has no throwaway time. Properly used, a twenty-minute
presentation will be as helpful to the court as a less taut thirty-minute
argument.
Every appellate court understands the use of an alternative argument and
knows that by suggesting an alternative the advocate does not waive his initial
contention. "Even if" or "alternatively" will sufficiently introduce an
alternative argument. The phraseology "Without waiving anything heretofore said to the contrary but specifically insisting thereon" is a trite formalism
which almost implies that the court has neither good sense nor good faith.
When you have finished writing a brief look it over with an editor's eye and
as dispassionately as you can. It should be clean and clear, as taut as a violin
string and as terse as a rifle shot. It should contain not an ounce of fat or an
excess word. There should be a minimum of repetition and no incorrect,
unclear, or misleading statements.
A good place to end a discussion of short and plain writing is to refer to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. It is immortal, and it is ten sentences long.
E.

Tell It Accurately

Every appellate advocate must state facts and law candidly and accurately.
This is an uncompromising absolute. "The mark of really able advocacy is the
ability to set forth the facts most favorably within the limits of utter and
unswerving accuracy." ' 39 Every sentence must shine with the whole truth.
Even when it has been misled the court may find the correct path, but the
attorney who is inaccurate or less than candid interferes with the objective of
persuasion. He comes to the court saying "please believe me and be persuaded." If it is revealed that what he says or writes cannot be believed, he
39.

F. WIENER, supra note I, at 49.
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forfeits the confidence which he seeks to create. The court's distrust of him
may taint his next appeal as well.
Telling the facts accurately does not mean just those facts favorable to your
side. It does not mean inferences stated as though they were facts. In an
appeal in which everything turned on whether the accused was inside a car or
standing outside the car when he was arrested, the defendant's statement of
the facts in his brief said, without qualification or reference to pages of the
record, that he was inside the car. The government's brief, with equal
assurance and without reference to what defendant had asserted, baldly
stated that defendant was outside the car. This sent me to the record to read
the testimony of all the persons at the scene. I discovered, as you might
expect, that some witnesses said defendant was inside the car, others said he
was outside. Both counsel had misled the court. Neither told us that the
evidence was in conflict and that the issue was whether permissible inferences had been drawn from the conflicting testimony. This is poor advocacy.
The statement of facts is not the place for argument or editorializing. This
belongs in the body of the brief. Also, the statement of facts frequently
reflects the ability of counsel. Under Fed. R. App. P. 28(b) the appellee need
not state any facts in his brief except to the extent that he is dissatisfied with
appellant's statement. It represents high standards of professionalism on the
part of both lawyers when the appellee can say, "appellee is satisfied with
appellant's statement," or, "appellee is satisfied with appellant's statement
40
except for the following additional fact (setting it out)."
F.

Tell It Courteously and in Moderation

Both brief and argument should reflect dignity and professional competence of the spokesman and respect for the courts, trial and appellate.
Improper tone is a self-created impediment. The court is made uncomfortable
by the lawyer who recklessly tosses out accusations that his adversary is
misleading the court or misstating the facts or is guilty of improper conduct.
Reflections on the adversary throw a shadow on the spokesman's own
standards and on the strength of his presentation. No one expects a good
lawyer to roll over and play dead. But firmness, and preservation of one's
own points and rights, seldom necessitate strident accusations or even
discourtesy.
Appropriate moderation in approach keeps the court comfortable and is
also persuasive. I say "appropriate" because a case may call for forceful
hard-hitting statements. But not every mosquito has to be killed with a
sledgehammer. Appellate judges, except brand new ones, have already
heard, and rejected, more ad hominem arguments than counsel can think up.
A judge who has normal sensibilities and loves the law will react on his own to
events that call for outrage. He may not respond favorably to urging that he
should be disturbed or outraged.
40. In almost all instances Fifth Circuit judges have read the briefs before oral argument, are
familiar with the issues, and are at least generally familiar with the facts. The presiding judge may
note this familiarity when the docket for the day begins, but, noted or not, counsel can rely upon
it.
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G. What Cases To Cite
On federal question matters the Fifth Circuit is interested first in the
Supreme Court decisions on the point and second in its own decisions. If the
Fifth Circuit decisions are adverse, and not distinguishable, counsel is faced
with the practice of the circuit that one panel will not overrule the decision of
another. He can, however, try to persuade the panel to which his case falls
(summary calendar or oral argument) to request that the question be heard by
the court en banc. Or, he can await an adverse decision from the panel and
then petition for rehearingen banc. 4'
Decisions of other circuits have third priority. But if the matter is settled in
the Fifth Circuit, the panel is not free to adopt a different rule followed by
another circuit. To do so would violate the policy that one panel not overrule
another. The fourth and final preference is for the decisions of district courts,
particularly those in the Fifth Circuit.
In diversity cases the court is interested first in the decisions of the state
whose law governs and any decisions of the Fifth Circuit and of the federal
district courts in that state concerning the state's law on the point. If no such
cases exist, then the general law should be supplied. The court is always
interested in law review discussions of whether the issue is based upon a
federal question or diversity. A law review piece may have persuasive effect,
and, in any event, the analysis and collection of authorities will assist the
court.
H.

Questions from the Bench

The panels of the Fifth Circuit ask questions, lots of questions, for several
reasons. The most likely reason is that the judge wants to know the answer to
his particular question. The argument is the place where the court can learn
what it does not know. Other possible reasons are: (I) The question is
designed to clarify or advance the argument, to get the speaker down to the
brass tacks he is not getting to on his own. (2) The questioner is seeking to
enliven a dull monologue and stay awake. (3) The question is intended to
advance the questioner's own point of view. (At times this is done by the
judge's challenging counsel who has a view different from his own, at other
times by the judge's serving up "home-run balls" to the counsel with whom
the judge agrees. I suppose this is a valid practice but it is overdone.) (4) The
judge is engaged in ego play of his own, demonstrating how much he knows
about the case and how well he understands it. But at least this may advance
the argument and even assist his colleagues.
In an assemblage where the purpose is to inform and persuade, it is like
manna from heaven for the potential persuadee to say to the persuader:
"Here is what troubles me about the subject on which you are trying to
convince me." This opening into the mind of the listener is the most valuable
piece of information the persuader can get. Most advocates understand this
41. Counsel can ask in the beginning that the case be heard by the court en banc rather than
assigned to a panel for hearing. It is very, very extraordinary for such a petition to be granted. At
times, however, the court on its own motion directs that a case be heard en banc along with
another case that is being reheard en banc, because the cases have common issues.
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principle and welcome questions from the bench and know how to capitalize
on them. Other counsel feel that the advocate is responsible for his own case
and should be permitted to present it in his own way. These attorneys resent
questions as intrusions into a carefully prepared and organized presentation.
But the court has its own responsibility to reach the correct decision, and only
the judge knows what problems still trouble him.
This subject of questioning from the bench came up for discussion in a
seminar at the 1975 Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference at Orlando. It surfaced
again in some of the state round-tables at the 1976 Judicial Conference in
Houston. I was surprised at the number of experienced advocates who
believe that they are over-questioned. Perhaps questioning is overdone in the
Fifth Circuit. I am certain that often the judge asks for help too soon. Judges
enjoy lively dialogue, but they too can, and do, impede the communicative
process. The solution lies, I believe, in moderation on both sides of the bench.
Counsel can recognize and accept the value of questions to the court and to
them. The court can exercise restraint through fewer and better thought-out
42
questions, and it can be a little slower on the trigger.

IV.

THE END RESULT

In concluding the written words in his brief, and finally his spoken words at
the podium, the advocate will endeavor to leave some parting impression
fixed in the minds of the judges who have read and listened. There is no better
impression to leave than this composite: "I understood what he said. He did
not say too much. I have confidence in what he said. I am persuaded by it and
am compelled to rule with him."

42. When the Fifth Circuit sits en banc there are so many judges that unlimited questioning
from the bench will cause the argument to break down. Thus the court en banc now has a
self-imposed practice that counsel is not subject to questioning during the first half of his opening
argument.

